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In many countries with a history of colonialism, customary law operates
in parallel with statutory law, with customary and religious laws governing
family or private life.' Customary law determines personal status and
property rights and has special implications for women's role in society and
ability to shape their destiny. Additionally, as the United Nations
Commission on HIV and the Law recognized, customary law impacts
women's health and can increase HIV risk.2 While this article focuses on
sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Anglophone countries formerly subject to
British colonial rule, it is broadly relevant for other countries that espouse
customary law and have plural legal systems.
Addressing customary law is a challenge as it is generally not officially
recorded or uniformly applied. In addition, customary law is interpreted
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differently depending upon the circumstances, the person whom it is applied
and the person who is interpreting the law. Although this ambiguity has led
to the wide use of customary law to disempower women and promote
patriarchy, customary law can also be a source of accessible justice and
norms responsive to community needs. Regardless of one's opinion of
customary law, it is the law goveming the lives of the majority of people on
the African continent,3 and a focus on it is critical to ensure human rights
protections for African women are meaningful. This essay outlines both the
pitfalls and possibilities of customary law and then proposes a set of essential
conditions to forge a path for women's rights, enabling communities to retain
customary law's advantages, while navigating its complexity. This draws
on cutting edge work with customary justice structures in Kenya and
Namibia, recent groundbreaking decisions by courts in Botswana and South
Africa and decisions by the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW Committee").
I. THE PROBLEM OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Customary law is used to promote patriarchy and disempower women.
The South African Constitutional Court described,
[t]he [customary law] exclusion of women from heirship and
consequently from being able to inherit property was in keeping with
a system dominated by a deeply embedded patriarchy which
reserved for women a position of subservience and subordination
and in which they were regarded as perpetual minors under the
tutelage of the fathers, husbands, or the head of the extended family.4
The constitutions of countries such as Botswana5 and Lesotho6 explicitly
include "clawback clauses" exempting customary law from the prohibition
against discrimination.7 Additionally, when ratifying the Convention on the
3. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 8 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds.,
2011) (noting that customary law governs the daily lives of more than three quarters of the
populations of most African countries). Moreover, most women access justice through
customary and informal justice systems in developing countries. INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE: MODELS, STRATEGIES
AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 12, 19 (2013), http://www.idlo.int
/sites/default/files/WomensAccesstoJustice FullReport.pdf.
4. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 78 (S. Afr.).
5. Constitution of Botswana (1966), Section 15(4)(c)(d) (exempting from the prohibition
against discrimination customary law and all laws addressing "adoption, marriage, divorce,
burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law").
6. Constitution of Lesotho (1993), Section 18(4)(b)(c) (exempting from the prohibition against
discrimination the customary law of Lesotho and all laws addressing "adoption, marriage,
divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other like matters ... [of] personal law").
7. However, advocates are challenging the treatment of clawback clauses as wholesale
exceptions to the protection of rights, positing that the exception itself should be limited. The
Botswana Court of Appeal recently endorsed this view in Ramantele v. Mmusi, Case No.
CACGB-104-12, Judgment [Botswana Court of Appeal], at para. 80 (Sept. 3, 2013).
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), 8
countries such as Lesotho entered reservations exempting themselves from
eliminating discrimination in customary practices as they relate to
inheritance and chieftainship.9 Customary law has carved out a space where
human rights protections are denied and discrimination can flourish.
Shielding customary law from human rights scrutiny strengthens the
existing division of power and penalizes both African women and the most
vulnerable populations. It ignores that "culture is constantly contested in a
political struggle between those who wish to legitimize their power and
privilege and those who need to challenge the status quo in order to redress
grievances, realize human dignity, and protect well-being."'0  The South
African Constitutional Court acknowledged the negative impact of
customary law provisions, nothing that the brunt of such impacts "falls
mainly on African women and children, regarded as arguably the most
vulnerable groups in our society.""
This power dynamic builds on the distortion caused by customary law
during the colonial era. Colonial rule "exaggerated and entrenched"
customary law's patriarchal bias,'2 strengthening traditional male leaders
and "[e]nthroning the male head of the household as the only true person in
law, sole holder of family property and civic status."'3 This served the
colonists' political and economic aims and fit with their own gender
ideology.14 In most communities, this destroyed the "strong rights of wives
8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/eIcedaw.htm [hereinafter CEDAW].
9. Masupha v. Magistrate, 2013 (Lesotho High Court), at para. 54. Frances Raday, a
former member of the CEDAW Committee, charged with its monitoring and enforcement
explained, "Many of the practices defended in the name of culture that impinge on human
rights are gender specific; they preserve patriarchy at the expense of women's rights."
Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and CEDAW's Article 5(a), in THE CIRCLE OF
EMPOWERMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 3(2007).
10. Abdullahi An-Na'im, State Responsibility under International Human Rights Law to
Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167, 173 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
I1. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 32 (S. Afr.).
12. Jill Zimmerman, The Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and
Discourse, 17 HARV. BLACK LETTER J. 197, 201-203 ((2001).
13. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 89 (S. Afr.) (quoting Nhlapo, African
Customary Law in the Interim Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A
GENDER PERSPECTIVE 162 (Liebenberg ed., 1995).
14. See Penelope E. Andrews, Who's Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the Boundaries of
Family, Equality and Custom, in South Africa, II UTAH L. REv. 351, 359, 369 (2009)
(referencing colonial use of indigenous custom as a way to ensure of cooperation from
indigenous leaders, and the utilization of traditional law social control and a steady stream of
labor in a time of growing urbanization); see also Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion
and Gender in Commonwealth Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 289, 297, 299-300 (2008)
(pointing to the expediency for colonial authorities of customary law distortions encouraging
despotism by indigenous male leaders whose cooperation they needed and to recognition of
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to security of tenure and use of land"' and women became legally
invisible.16  The South African Constitutional Court recognized that
women "were deprived of the opportunity to manipulate the rules to their
advantage through the subtle interplay of social norms, and at the same
time, denied the protection of the formal legal order." 7  In a sense,
"[w]omen became 'outlaws."8
Moreover, customary law was "distorted in a manner that emphasize[d]
its patriarchal features and minimize[d] its communitarian ones"" by
divorcing authority from social responsibility. Male heirs would take over
family property, but not family responsibilities, and begin evicting women
and children from their home, failing "to administer their respective estates
for the benefit of their father's dependents."20 Widows were also frequently
subject to property grabbing by in-laws upon their husband's death.2 1
only African males as title holders as resonating with the British conception of the family);
see also INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 21 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds.,
2011) ("The colonial state system ... facilitated a strategic simplification of the land tenure
system, by enabling certain male leaders to consolidate their control over land ... [T]he
foreigners perceptions of property and authority enabled male leaders-who historically have
been 'caretakers' of the land-to claim rights wholesale."); see also INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), TOWARD CUSTOMARY LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT IN NAMIBIA: ENHANCING GENDER EQUALITY IN CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS
8 (Janine Ubink, ed., 2011) ("The colonial rulers' gender ideology was not in consonance
with the existence of powerful women. Further, they perceived a strong need to maintain the
authority of male elders over women and young people to ensure order and stability.").
15. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 89 (S. Afr.) (quoting Nhlapo, African
Customary Law in the Interim Constitution in THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A
GENDER PERSPECTIVE 162 (Liebenberg ed., 1995). See also Anne Whitehead & Dzodzi
Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women's Land Rights in sub-Saharan Africa: The Implications
of Return to the Customary, V.3(1,2) J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 73-74 (2003); Laurel L. Rose,
Women's Strategies for Customary Land Access in Swaziland and Malawi: A Comparative
Study, 49(2) AFRICA TODAY, 123, 123 (2002) ("Women's customary access and usage rights
to land ... were either ignored or subsumed under male interests.").
16. Angeline Shenje-Peyton, Balancing Gender, Equality, and Cultural Identity: Marriage
Payments in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 105, 112-113 (1996) (explaining
how colonialism helped lead to perpetual minority for African women).
17. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 89 (S. Afr.) (quoting Nhlapo, African
Customary Law in the Interim Constitution in THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A
GENDER PERSPECTIVE 162 (Liebenberg ed., 1995).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 L.R.C. 36, 46 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.) (quoting Chihowa v.
Mangwende, [1987] 1 ZLR 228, at 231-232). See also Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (CC), at 173
(Ngcobo, J., partially dissenting) (quoting Mbatha, Reforming the Customary Law ofSuccession,
18 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 259,261 (2002)) ("[Poverty and unemployment, together with the failure
to look after the interests of the deceased's dependants have distorted the customary law of
succession, undermined its protective value to other family members and forced members to
assume the heir's responsibilities for looking after the needy, the sick and the aged.").
21. James Thomas, et al., PROTECTING THE LAND AND INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF HIV-
AFFECTED WOMEN IN KENYA AND UGANDA: A COMPENDIUM OF CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC
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These distortions became socially pronounced as customary law
solidified in a growing number of communities in an attempt to adhere to a
mythical past:
At a time when the patriarchal features of Roman-Dutch law were
progressively being removed by legislation, customary law was
robbed of its inherent capacity to evolve in keeping with the
changing life of the people it served, particularly women. Thus
customary law as administered failed to respond creatively to new
kinds of economic activity by women, different forms of property
and household arrangements for women and men, and changing
values concerning gender roles in society. The outcome has been
formalization and fossilization ... .2
This ossification was partially due to the sources consulted in defining
customary law as the judicial norm is to reference sociological or
anthropological authorities in establishing the relevant customary law.23
However, as noted by the Botswana Court of Appeal, "texts and articles...
merely record the position of a given custom as it prevailed at a particular
point in the life or history of a tribal community but not subsequently."24 For
instance, in Magaya v. Magaya, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court turned to two
South African treatises to determine Shona customary law-neither of which
were written by Shona members or even black Africans.2 5  These
interpretations are quite removed from the customary practices the court is
so concerned about preserving.
The Zimbabwean courts' static notion of customary law differs sharply
from the flexible oral tradition it is interpreting. The South African treatise
authors acknowledge that the principles and practice of customary law are
"subject to variation and differences."2 6 This is the case since "indigenous law
AND MONITORING AND EVALUATION APPROACHES, (Measure ed. 2013); Human Rights Watch,
HIDDEN IN THE MEALIE MEAL: GENDER-BASED ABUSES AND WOMEN'S HIV TREATMENT IN
ZAMBIA (Dec. 2007); Human Rights Watch, POLICY PARALYSIS: A CALL FOR ACTION ON
HIV/AIDS-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN AFRICA,
December 2003; Tamar Ezer, Inheritance Law in Tanzania: The Impoverishment of Widows
and Daughters, 7 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW, 599-662 (2006).
22. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 90 (S. Afr.).
23. Jill Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 213; Celestine 1. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights
and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing
Countries, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 414 (2000); see also Ramantele v. Mmusi, 2013
(Botswana Court of Appeal), at 79 ("The respondents counsel has drawn the Court's attention
to an account of a socio-economic study of the Ngwaketse carried out in 1980 by Ornulf
Gulbrandsen from the University of Bergen, Norway.").
24. Ramantele v. Mmusi, 2013 (Botswana Court of Appeal), at para. 77 (Sept. 3, 2013).
25. Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 L.R.C. 36, 40 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.) (quoting GELFAND &
GOLDIN, AFRICAN LAW AND CUSTOM IN RHODESIA 284 and BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 126).
26. Id. (quoting GELFAND & GOLDIN, AFRICAN LAW AND CUSTOM IN RHODESIA 284).
Likewise, in Kenya, "the details of the cultural aspects that come into play on any issue . . .
vary from community to community. Even in a community they may vary from one family
to another." KELIN, Accessing Justice and Protecting the Rights of the Vulnerable through
Winter 20161 FORGING A PATH 69
is not a fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules. By its
nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of
life and "[i]t has throughout history 'evolved and developed to meet the
changing needs of the community."'27  Similarly, the Botswana Court of
Appeal noted that, customary law "develops and modernizes with the times,
harsh and inhumane aspects of custom ... discarded" and "more liberal and
flexible aspects... continuously modified."2 8 Thus, customary law, as applied
in African communities, is meant to change with a community's needs and
evolving social practices of the people to whom it is applied.
However, court interpretations of customary law have not allowed for
this flexibility and dynamism. As a result, official customary rules have
become "increasingly out of step with real values and circumstances of the
societies they were meant to serve."2 9 As African society has modernized
and urbanized, this gap has continued to grow. As Justice Ngcobo explained:
The cattle-based economy has largely been replaced by a cash-based
economy. Impoverishment, urbanization and the migrant labor
system have fundamentally affected the traditional family structures.
The role and status of women in modern urban, and even rural, areas
extend far beyond that imposed on them by their status in traditional
society. Many women are de facto heads of their families. They
support themselves and their children by their own efforts. Many
contribute to the acquisition of family assets.30
Thus, the status of women under customary law is often at odds with
reality because of the changing roles of women in the modern world.
Moreover, with the restructuring of families along nuclear lines, an heir does
not always live with all his extended family. He may, therefore, not be best
suited to take on the customary social responsibilities that come with the
family property even if he wanted to. Instead, he "often simply acquires the
estate without assuming, or even being in a position to assume any of the
deceased's responsibilities."31
The complexity of customary law is marked both by its definition as well
as its application. Primarily, the lack of codification has led to inconsistent
interpretations of what truly is customary law. As the South African
Cultural Structures: A Tool on Working with Elders in a Community 2, http://
kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/1 0/Working-with-Cultural-Structures-A4FNAL.pdf.
27. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 81 (S. Afr.) (quoting Alexkor Ltd. v.
Richtersveld Cmty., 2003 (BCLR) 1301 (cc) at 53 (S. Afr.).
28. Ramantele v. Mmusi, Case No. CACGB-104-12, Judgment [Botswana Court of
Appeal], at para. 77 (Sept. 3, 2013); see also id. at para. 26 (Kirby, J., concurring) ("There are
two outstanding characteristics of customary law, namely its evolutionary nature and its
flexibility."); Laurence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in
Kenya: Making a Case for Institutional Reformation and Revitalization of Customary
Adjudication Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 459, 511(2002) (pointing to the flexibility
and adaptability of African customary law).
29. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 82(S. Afr.).
30. Id. at para. 221 (S. Afr.) (Ngcobo, J., partially dissenting).
31. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 80 (S. Afr.).
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Constitutional Court described, local adaptations are "ad hoc and not
uniform." 32 Meanwhile, "magistrates and the courts responsible for the
administration of intestate estates continue to adhere to the rules of official
customary law, with the consequent anomalies and hardships as a result of
changes which have occurred in society."33
Further, the state-enforced application of customary law to specific groups
is often discriminatory. This is largely because the application relies on choice
of law provisions that channel black Africans into a separate and
discriminatory system, perpetuating ghettoization under colonial rule. As the
South African Constitutional Court explained, "[P]eople are still treated as
'blacks' rather than as ordinary persons seeking to wind up a deceased estate,
and it is in conflict with the establishment of a non-racial society where rights
and duties are no longer determined by origin and skin colour."34 In Tanzania,
statutes require that customary law regulate succession for "a person who is or
was a member of a community in which rules of customary law relevant to the
matter are established and accepted."3 Thus, women of African origin are
deprived of inheritance based on their gender and ethnicity. In Lesotho,
discrimination against Africans is even more explicit. Africans cannot write a
will and decide on the administration of their estates unless they can show that
they "have abandoned tribal custom and adopted a European mode of life."36
Such choice of law provisions are "specifically crafted to fit in with notions of
separation and exclusion of Africans from people of 'European' descent."3 7
This forms a kind of legal apartheid where the state forces discriminatory and
ossified customs upon black Africans, and customary law becomes "an
instrument of segregation and domination."
Discriminatory choice of law provisions that mandate the application of
customary law to specific groups are further not saved by the option to write
a will. As the South African Constitutional Court pointed out, this would
only allow "those with sufficient resources, knowledge, education or
opportunity" to "extricate themselves" and benefit from this option.39
Moreover, a well-established principle of equal protection is the
insufficiency of the ability to opt out if a discriminatory law is in question.
In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, the United Sates Supreme Court struck down a
statute enabling the husband to unilaterally dispose of joint property unless
the wife takes certain steps to protect her interests, highlighting that "the
absence of an insurmountable barrier will not redeem an otherwise
32. Id. at para. 87 (S. Afr.).
33. Id.
34. Id. at para. 64 (S. Afr.) (quoting Mosenke v. The Master, 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC), at para. 21).
35. Tamar Ezer, Inheritance Law in Tanzania: The Impoverishment of Widows and
Daughters, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 599, 607 (2006).
36. Masupha v. Magistrate, Case No. 5/2010, Judgment [Lesotho High Court], 140 (May
3, 2013) (citing Administration of Estates Proclamation 19 of 1935).
37. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 82 (S. Afr.).
38. Evadn6 Grant, Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Customary Law in South Africa,
50 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW 1, 15 (2006).
39. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 66 (S. Afr.).
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unconstitutionally discriminatory law."40 Discriminatory customary law
also faces women with an untenable choice, as articulated by Abdullahi An-
Na'im, "between enduring inequality and discrimination in order to enjoy
many vital benefits of membership in their own communities, or abandoning
all that by opting-out of the community in order to enjoy equality and
freedom from discrimination with the wider state society."4'
Additionally, the application of customary law raises critical questions
as to who interprets it and the boundaries of their authority. In 2012, the
South African government introduced a Traditional Courts Bill, which
would have bestowed vast powers on local chiefs as presiding officers in
traditional courts, providing them with jurisdiction over a wide range of
issues, including criminal offenses; permitting them to enforce sanctions,
such as forced labor; leaving little room for community involvement in
dispute resolution; and allowing for only limited appeal and no opt out
provision.4 2 In effect, this would have created a separate legal system for 17
million people living in rural South Africa. Not surprisingly, it was widely
criticized as unconstitutional for entrenching the autocratic power chiefs had
under apartheid at the expense of women and other vulnerable groups and
was finally withdrawn.43  As this reflects, procedure is as important as
substance in preventing abuse and protecting women's rights.
II. THE POTENTIAL OF CUSTOMARY LAW
Despite the difficulties with customary law, it also has some important
advantages. Customary law is flexible and sensitive to context and can be a
creative source of norms and practices responsive to community needs.44 At
its heart, it promotes communal values, creating "a setting which contributes
to the unity of family structures and the fostering of co-operation, a sense of
responsibility in and belonging to its members."45 It can thus fill gaps in the
formal legal system, complementing and strengthening it.
In addition to its substantive provisions, customary law brings with it
40. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
41. Abdullahi An-Na'im, State Responsibility under International Human Rights Law to
Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167, 180 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
42. The Republic of South Africa, Traditional Courts Bill [BI-2012], http://www.
justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2012-bO1tradcourts.pdf
43. "Traditional Courts Bill is Dead!" Media Statement by the Alliance for Rural
Democracy, Feb. 21, 2014, http://www.customcontested.co.za/traditional-courts-bill-dead/;
see also The Traditional Courts Bill: Examining the Gaps, 14(1) LOCAL GOVERNMENT
BULLETIN 16 (2012).
44. Mayelane v. Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC), at para. 24 (S. Afr.); INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE: MODELS, STRATEGIES
AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 20 (2013), http://www.idlo.int/sites/
default/files/WomensAccess to JusticeFull-Report.pdf.
45. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 45 (S. Afr.); see also Ramantele v.
Mmusi, 2013 (Botswana Court of Appeal), at para. 28 (Kirby, J., concurring) (pointing to the
"overall objective" of customary courts "to achieve reconciliation and consensus among the
disputants.").
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community justice structures useful for resolving disputes. Courts are not the
best solution for most disputes.46 They are expensive, time consuming, and
hard to reach outside city centers. Court cases are also inherently adversarial,
exacerbating tensions.47 For instance, Kenya Legal and Ethical Issues
Network on HIV and AIDS ("KELIN"), which works with HIV affected
widows who have been kicked of their land in western Kenya, reports that
even with a positive court decision, it is difficult for a widow to come back
and live with her family.4 8  Customary justice structures, by contrast,
emphasize amicable resolution and the restoration of harmony. As the South
African Constitutional Court explained, "Customary law places much store in
consensus-seeking and naturally provides for family and clan meetings which
offer excellent opportunities for the prevention and resolution of disputes and
disagreements."4
III. CHARTING A WAY FORWARD
Effectively navigating the complexities of customary law can turn it into
an asset. In order to benefit from customary law's advantages, while
avoiding its pitfalls, it must operate within a human rights framework with
careful attention to its definition, development, and application.
A. CUSTOMARY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Critically, customary law must engage with human rights norms. There
needs to be a dialogue between local culture and international human rights
standards, enriching both and engaging "all cultural traditions in the process
46. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/JusticeGaInA
merica2009.authcheckdam.pdf. Even in settings like the United States, there is a need for
more cost effective and efficient resolution of disputes at community level or through small
claims courts with the option of a court case as a last resort.
47. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE:
MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 16-17 (2013), http://w
ww.idlo.int/sites/default/files/WomensAccessto_JusticeFullReport.pdf; INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 8 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds., 2011).
48. Tamar Ezer, Innovating Justice for Widows in Kenya, Open Society Foundations,
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/innovating-justice-widows-kenya (Sept. 21,
2012); Catherine Muyeka Mumma, Accessing Justice and Protecting the Rights of the
Vulnerable through Cultural Structures: A Tool on Working with Elders in a Community,
KELIN, 4 (2010), http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Working-with-Cultural
-Structures-A4FINAL.pdf; see also INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION
(IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE: MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S
EMPOWERMENT 16 (2013), http://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/WomensAccess toJus
ticeFullReport.pdf (noting that "when a woman succeeds in court, she may subsequently
face threats of violence, altercations, beatings and murder").
49. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 45 (S. Afr.); see also Mayelane v.
Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC), at para. 24 (S. Afr.).
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of promoting and sustaining" a global human rights consensus.50 Custom
should not be seen as a separate sphere based on a flawed distinction between
public and private space. As the women's movement has proclaimed, "the
personal is political."
Thus, culture cannot be used as an excuse to justify discrimination and
deny certain people basic human rights protections. CEDAW calls on
states "[t]o take all appropriate measures . . . to modify or abolish . . .
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women,"5 2
including addressing "the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women."53 This is echoed in the African human rights system by the
Maputo Protocol, requiring states to "commit themselves to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men . .. with a view
to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and
men."54  The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
likewise mandates "all appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social
and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and
development of the child . . ..
Just this March 2015, the CEDAW Committee, the U.N. body
responsible for monitoring state compliance with CEDAW, decided E.S. and
S.C. v. Tanzania, its first case on discriminatory customary law denying
women equal access to property and inheritance rights. This landmark case,
brought by two Tanzanian widows, challenged discriminatory provisions of
Tanzanian customary law codified in 1963 and in force in 30 districts. The
Committee held that "by condoning such legal restraints on inheritance and
property rights," the State "has denied the authors' equality in respect of
50. Abdullahi An-Na'im, State Responsibility under International Human Rights Law to
Change Religious and Customary Laws, supra note 41, at 173. Abdullahi An-Na'im further
describes the relationship between international human rights standards and local culture as
"a genuinely reciprocal global collaborative effort." Id.
51. Linda Napikoski, The Personal Is Political, http://womenshistory.about.com/od/
feminism/a/consciousnessraising.htm; see also Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human
Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in
Developing Countries, 41 HARV. INT'L L... 381, 391 (2000) (explaining how feminists have
challenged the public/private distinction, "noting that violations against women occur mainly
in the private sphere, and refusal to intervene perpetuates structures that deny women equal
enjoyment of rights"); see also Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in
Commonwealth Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 289, 316-320 (2008) (describing the flawed
public/private dichotomy and how it has harmed women).
52. CEDAW, Art. 2(f).
53. CEDAW, Art. 5(a).
54. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa art. 2(2), July 11, 2003, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%
20the%20Rights%20of/o20Women.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Maputo Protocol].);
see also id. at art. 17(1) ("Women shall have the right to live in a positive cultural context.").
55. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 21(1), Nov. 29, 1999,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Charter EnAfricanCharterontheRights-and_W
lefare of theChildAddisAbabaJulyl990.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
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inheritance and failed to provide them with any means of economic security
or any form of adequate redress."56
Customary law is similarly subject to constitutional scrutiny and, in fact,
derives official authority from a country's constitution. For instance, under
the South African Constitution, "Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or
linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of
that community ... to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their
language" but these rights "may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with any provision of the Bill of Rights."" Thus, as the South African
Constitutional Court clarified, "as with all the law, the constitutional validity
of rules and principles of customary law depend on their consistency with
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights."5 Kenya's Constitution echoes these
principles as well.s9 In fact, in its 2015 report, the U.N. Working Group "on
the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice," highlights
the benefits of formal constitutional recognition of indigenous law and
courts, "requiring the legal systems of indigenous communities to respect
and enforce women's rights."6 0 As a result, a country's constitution both
establishes the authority of customary law, and yet, also limits its application.
Customary law requires development to comply with human rights and
constitutional provisions and respond to the current needs of communities.
The South African Constitution specifically calls upon "every court, tribunal
or forum" to develop both common and customary law in accordance with
"the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."6' Thus, rather than
simply striking down customary law, when possible, as Justice Mokgoro
explained, the tension between customary law and the right to equality is
eased "by a harmonization process that draws from our rich cultural
values."62 This avoids the development of parallel legal systems-a formal
56. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, E.S. and S.C. v. Tanz.,
U.N. Doc. Tanzania, CEDAW/C/60/D/48/2013, at para. 7.9 (2015).
57. Const. of the Republic of S. Afr., May 8, 1996, sec. 31; see also id. at sec. 31; South
Africa Constitution, Section 30 ("Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate
in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.").
58. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 46 (S. Afr.); see also Mayelane
Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA (415) ("[L]iving customary law reflects the rights and values of
the Constitution from which it draws its legal force.").
59. Const. of Kenya Aug. 27, 2010, art. 2(4) ("Any law, including customary law, that is
inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or
omission in contravention of this Constitution is invalid."). The Constitution further clarifies
that "[t]raditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall not be used in a way that contravenes the
Bill of Rights" or is "inconsistent" with the Constitution or any written law. Id. at art. 159(3).
60. Rep. of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in
practice, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/4056, at para. 56 (Apr. 2,2015).
61. Const. of the Republic of S. Aft., May 8, 1996, sec. 39(2).
62. Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, The Impact ofSouth Africa's Constitutional Court on Gender
Equity: A Case Law Approach, Presentation at Congressional Breakfast on the Impact of South
Africa's Constitutional Court on Gender Equity (Apr. 13, 2005) at 16; see also Frances Raday,
Culture, Religion, and CEDA W's Article 5(a), The Circle of Empowerment: Twenty-five Years
of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, at p. 3 (Hanna Beate
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legal system recognizing women's equality but not applied in practice and
an informal, discriminatory system, which is actually applied.63
Customary justice structures thus also have an important role in
protection of human rights. In 2009, KELIN pioneered a new approach
partnering with customary justice structures in Homabay and Kisumu
Counties in Kenya, high HIV prevalence areas where many young widows
are kicked off their land and left homeless and destitute by their in-laws.
KELIN helped reconstruct community-based mediation systems so that they
respect human rights and Kenyan law and could reinstate property to
widows. Human rights trainings for both community elders and widows are
a core component of this project. KELIN's trainings were particularly well-
received by the Luo Council of Elders, which now seeks to incorporate a
human rights perspective in their work and transform practices that
negatively impact on women and conflict with Kenyan laws. Over the past
six years, KELIN has taken on 299 cases involving disinheritance, of which
the 216 have been successfully resolved with women and children back on
their land. Cases on average take only three months to resolve, compared to
three years and the unpredictable outcomes of court cases."6 The United
Nations Global Commission on HIV and the Law applauded KELIN's
groundbreaking work, noting, "Perhaps the most promising route to change
is adaptation of traditional legal systems to promote equality for women and
their children and recruitment of respected community members to mediate
inheritance disputes between widows and their in-laws."65 To share this
approach and hopefully lead to broader change, KELIN has developed a tool
providing step by step guidelines on how to engage customary structures in
advancing human rights.66
One critical aspect of KELIN's approach is the provision of human rights
trainings to both community elders and widows. Community elders are often
eager for training and development, providing an opening for human rights
engagement.6 ' The community shapes the environment in which customary
Schopp-Schilling & Cees Flinterman eds., 3 (2007)) ("The traditionalist cultures accord with a
perception of culture as a relatively static and homogeneous system, bounded, isolated, and
stubbornly resistant. The contrasting view regards culture as adaptive, in a state of constant
change, and rife with internal conflicts and inconsistencies. Where an adaptive culture accepts
the human rights demand for gender equality, there will be a process of interactive development
rather than confrontation.").
63. Lorenzo Cotula, Gender and Law-Women's Rights in Agriculture, 76 Food and Agric.
Org. of the U.N. Rome, 2002 at 166.
64. Tamar Ezer, supra note 48; see also BRINGING JUSTICE TO HEALTH: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT PROJECTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH 16-17 (Sebastian Krueger ed., 2013),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/bringing-justice-health.
65. United Nations Global Commission on HIV and the Law, HIV and the Law: Risks,
Rights and Health (2012), http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/report.
66. Catherine Muyeka Mumma, Accessing Justice and Protecting the Rights of the
Vulnerable through Cultural Structures: A Tool on Working with Elders in a Community,
KELIN, 4 (2010), http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/20 1 /1 0/Working-with-Cultural
-Structures-A4FINAL.pdf. [hereinafter KELIN]
67. Informal Justice Systems: Charting a Course for Human Rights-Based Engagement,
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justice structures operate and plays an important role in their monitoring and
accountability, requiring knowledge of basic rights.68 This is captured as a
key lesson in IDLO's (International Development and Law Organization)
reflections on access to justice projects for women: "When women are
informed of their rights and encouraged to discuss and challenge informal
laws and practices, they can put pressure on customary justice systems to
better protect basic rights. In turn, this can reduce power imbalances and
elite capture and improve the transparency of local government decision-
making."69  In E.S. and SC. v. Tanzania, the CEDAW Committee
recognized this importance of human rights training, recommending both
relief to the individual applicants, as well as "mandatory capacity-building
for judges, prosecutors, judicial personnel, and lawyers" and "awareness-
raising and education measures to enhance women's knowledge of their
rights."7 These measures are essential to ensure good law and court
decisions actually impact the reality of women's lives.
B. DEFINING CUSTOMARY LAW
However, the foundational question is how customary law is defined in
the first place. This is fundamentally a task for communities, respecting their
agency and right to self-determination, as recognized by the African Human
Rights Charter.71 Moreover, as Sanele Sibanda explains, "If customary law
is rightly conceptualized in cultural terms, then there is the need to
democratize ... it . .. so that those closest to it have the means to determine
its content and its relevance to their lives, or equally to reject it when it no
longer resonates with their sense of self." 72
The community must thus undertake some way of indicating its essential
customs. Before KELIN could start work with community justice structures
to reinstate land to widows, they held a series of community dialogues to
UNITED NATIONS, 23 (2012), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%
20Governance/Access%20to%20Justice%20and%2Rule%200%P/2OLaw/Informal-Justice-S
ystems-Charting-a-Course-for-Human-Rights-Based-Engagement.pdf.
68. KELIN's methodology "emphasizes participatory and people centered approaches
where the vulnerable are empowered to know their rights and demand or negotiate for
protection against violations." Mumma, supra note 66, at 7.
69. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE:
MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 8 (2013),
http://ww.idlo.int/sites/default/files/Womens Access-toJusticeFullReport.pdf; see also
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY JUSTICE:
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 15 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds., 2011).
70. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, E.S. and S.C. v. Tanz.,
U.N. Doc. Tanzania, CEDAW/C/60/D/48/2013, at para. 7.9 (2015).
71. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 20(1), June 27, 1981, http://
www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-
Rights.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
72. Sanele Sibanda, When is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Constitutional Law
under South Africa's Constitutional Dispensation, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 31, 34 (2010); see also
Johanna E. Bond, Gender Discourse and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509,
6 (2010) (pointing out that in addition to being dynamic, customary law is highly contested,
which makes it well-suited for democratic deliberation).
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identify core community values and the practices that should apply in these
cases. These dialogues involved the elders, as wells as the widows
themselves and other community leaders. Similarly, when Owambo
traditional communities in Namibia set about codification of their customary
law, they engaged in a process of assessment and reflection, harmonizing
their laws and ensuring they met constitutional requirements.74 As part of
this process, they unanimously affirmed widows' right to their land and
homes and abolished property grabbing.
There is debate as to whether the codification of customary law is
fundamentally good or bad. The South African Constitutional Court
characterizes customary law as fundamentally unwritten,76 drawing a
distinction between living customary law and the customary law
encapsulated in textbooks, codes, and court cases. Because official
customary law fails to account for the dynamism and change in society, it is
"generally a poor reflection, if not a distortion of the true customary law."
Courts are thus tasked with determining "whether a particular rule is a
mythical stereotype, which has become ossified in the official code, or
whether it continues to enjoy social currency."79
However, this is not an easy task for a court not well versed in the
particular customs it is determining. Consequently, interpretations may
differ depending on the judge, leading to arbitrary and unjust differences.
This undermines the legitimacy of authority, which requires predictability,
or "a reasonable expectation that the rules of tomorrow are going to be
roughly the same rules as today."80  Even while the South African
Constitutional Court rejects codification, the Court acknowledges "the need
for flexibility and development must be balanced against the value of legal
certainty" and "respect for vested rights."8' Moreover, when a court relies
on local experts for assistance, their impartiality may be difficult to assess,
particularly when norms are contested and variations exist.82 In fact, studies
73. Tamar Ezer,supra note 48; KEL[N, Accessing Justice and Protecting the Rights ofthe
Vulnerable through Cultural Structures: A Tool on Working with Elders in a Community 7-
15, http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Working-with-Cultural-Structures-A4
FINAL.pdf.
74. Janine Ubink, Toward Customary Legal Empowerment in Nambia; Enhancing Gender
Equality in Customary Justice Systems, INT'L DEV. AND L. ORG. 15 (2011).
75. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE:
MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 27, 33 (2013),
http://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/WomensAccesstoJusticeFullReport.pdf
76. Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty., Constitutional Court of South Africa, T 53 (Dec.
14, 2003), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2003/18.pdf (BCLR).
77. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 86-87 (S. Afr.).
78. Id. at para. 86.
79. Id. (quoting BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 64 (Juta & Co., Ltd., Cape Town 1997)).
80. MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID & GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS AND THE ART OF
BATTLING GIANTS 208 (2013).
81. Mayelane v. Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC), at para. 45 (S. Afr.).
82. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY JUSTICE:
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 13 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds., 2011).
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show that in colonial Kenya, information provided by elders on customary
law in expert panels led to the institution of rules that permanently favored
them to the disadvantage of women and junior men.83
Additionally, the lack of codification is particularly problematic for
women. When customary law is not well defined, conflicts between
customary law and human rights requirements are difficult to identify and
address. With fewer resources than men to push for realization of their rights,
women are particularly disadvantaged by ambiguity in customary law.84
Thus, codification can be quite valuable, as long as a few conditions are
met: (1) it complies with human rights, as discussed above, (2) it is rooted in
community engagement, (3) the focus is on core values, and (4) there is a
process for customary law's ongoing development. Codification should
incorporate a human rights analysis and the rights-based principles of
participation, accountability, nondiscrimination, and empowerment." True
community engagement in defining customary law is critical to allow for
input from multiple perspectives, including women, the marginalized, and
youth.86 Indeed, under the Maputo Protocol to the African Human Rights
Charter, women have the right "to participate at all levels in the
determination of cultural policies."87 Relying only on chiefs and other elites
may lead to biased representation, and hence, leave out many voices and edit
out customary law's variety.8 8  Moreover, the role of traditional leaders
should not be overplayed-they may not actually enjoy the power they
83. Id.; see also Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth
Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 289, 298 (2008) (describing how witnesses, who were usually
male elders, offered interpretations favorable to their position).
84. Andrew P. Kult, Intestate Succession in South Africa: The "Westernization" of
Customary Law Practices within a Modern Constitutional Framework, II IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 697, 710-11 (2001) (describing how ambiguity in customary law can work against
women and particularly widows, "rarely in apposition to enforce their rights"); see also Laurel
L. Rose, Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the Gap Between
Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197,250 (2004)
(describing the difficulties for women caused by legal uncertainties in customary law).
85. FXB CENTER FOR HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS & OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS,
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE GUIDE 1.31 (2013) (defining the key elements of the
human rights-based approach), http://fxb.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2013/09/H
HRRG-master.pdf.
86. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE:
MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 8 (2013), http://w
ww.idlo.int/sites/default/files/WomensAccessto_JusticeFullReport.pdf (explaining how
when "women are provided with a forum to discuss and [re]interpret cultural or legal rules,"
this can lead to "positive transformation").
87. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa, art. 17(1). In E.S. and S. C. v. Tanzania, the CEDAW Committee recommended
dialogue and consultations between civil society, women's organizations, and local
authorities, including traditional leaders, to reform customary law and remove discriminatory
provisions. CEDAW/C/60/D/48/2013, at para. 9(v) (March 2015).
88. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 11 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds.,
2011); Jill Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 203.
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claim.89  In this way, codification should not be a mere anthropological
exercise or an attempt to reclaim a mythical past. Rather, it is an opportunity
for a community to delineate its values and the society it would like to be, as
in the Owambo example. Forgoing community engagement, codifications
of customary law can exacerbate inequalities. Indeed, this was the case with
the colonial codification project. Under colonial rule, male heirs and chiefs
consolidated their authority at the expense of women and other family
members.90 As Jill Zimmerman explains, these codifications were "produced
through processes that privileged elite male responses ... as singularly
culturally 'authentic,"' leaving out "the competing cultural experiences of
women and youth."91 The codification of Tanzanian customary law, which
provides for guardianship over adult women, is a case in point.92 For instance,
under one egregious provision, "The widow has no share of inheritance if the
deceased left relatives of his clan. Her share is to be cared for by her
children."93 Women are thus denied property in their own right and relegated
to the position of minors. These codifications not only exacerbated
inequalities, but failed at their very aim of capturing a community's guiding
customs, creating a gap between official records and practice.
This is in sharp contrast to self-codification projects, such as that
undertaken by the Owambo. The Owambo codification project impacted
practice and actually reflects the principles currently guiding dispute
resolution.94 In a study, almost all respondents agreed that the recording of
customary law made traditional court decisions fairer, enhancing certainty,
predictability, and harmonization among various courts.95  Traditional
89. "Many of the supposed tents of African land tenure, ... the place of chiefs and elders,
have been shown to have been largely created and sustained by colonial policy." Anne
Whitehead & Dzodzi Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women's Land Rights in sub-Saharan
Africa: The Implications of Return to the Customary, V.3 (1, 2) J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 75
(2003); see also Penelope E. Andrews, Who's Afraid ofPolygamy? Exploring the Boundaries
ofFamily, Equality and Custom in South Africa, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 351, 369 (2009); Johanna
E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 289, 299-300 (2008).
90. Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 200-04 (describing codification in the British Colony
of Natal in 1878 by an all-white board which "explicitly strengthened patriarchal leaders and
the vertical bonds of hierarchy that supported and legitimated their rule").
91. Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 203.
92. Tamar Ezer, et al., Child Marriage and Guardianship in Tanzania: Robbing Girls of
Their Childhood and Infantilizing Women, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 357 (2006).
93. Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order, Government Notice (GN)
436/1963, sched. 2, Laws on Inheritance [Sheria za Urithi], in Judicature and Application of
Laws Act, TANZ. LAWS SUBSIDIARY LEGIS. [CAP 358 R.E. 2002], rule 27.
94. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 24, 132-133 (Janine Ubink, Thomas
McInemey, eds., 2011); INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO),
TOWARD CUSTOMARY LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN NAMIBIA: ENHANCING GENDER EQUALITY IN
CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS 34-35 (Janine Ubink, ed., 2011).
95. IDLO, CUSTOMARY JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 141-142; INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), IDLO, TOWARD CUSTOMARY LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT, supra note 94, at 30, 35.
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leaders reported that the written laws increased the legitimacy and
acceptability of their decisions.96 An additional effect of the codification
project was the "significantly enhanced legal knowledge of local villagers."97
Additionally, in defining customary law, the focus should be on core
concepts and values and the rationale behind particular rules and practices.
Practices, in any case, are generally not uniform, and a custom "may have
one of various acceptable manifestations."98 With its diversity, customary
law itself can serve as a source of "untapped richness" for its further
development.9 9 This is because customary laws "are less rule frameworks
than sets of principles tailored to specific contexts and malleable in changing
circumstances."100  Communities should thus focus on defining key
principles to guide dispute resolution. In the Owambo project, the aim was
not comprehensive codification, but rather the recording of substantive and
procedural norms considered of particular importance.'0
Finally, there must be provision for customary law's continuing reform
and development. Codification does not signify immutability, inscribing
customary law into stone. It is not codification alone, but codification
without a process for change, that is dangerous. Even codified Tanzanian
customary law at least clarifies rights, providing an opening for human rights
challenges and evolving customs discriminating against women. In fact, two
Tanzanian women did exactly that in E.S. and S.C. v. Tanzania, taking their
case all the way up to the CEDAW Committee, which found these
discriminatory customar provisions in violation of human rights norms and
Tanzania's obligations.
C. DEVELOPFNG CUSTOMARY LAW
Over the last few years, a number of interesting initiatives focusing on
customary law's development have emerged. These initiatives point to roles
for both the community and its institutions in shaping customary law, a core
component of a society's heritage.
As the KELIN and Owambo examples show, the community can play an
important role in developing customary law. The African Human Rights
Charter explicitly recognizes the rights of all people to social and cultural
development.03 Indeed, at critical moments, communities may decide to take
stock and set up a process to steer the development of their customary law.
However, on a daily basis, customary justice structures are best placed to
96. IDLO, CUSTOMARY JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 142-143; IDLO, TOWARD CUSTOMARY
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 94, at 31, 35.
97. IDLO, CUSTOMARY JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 142-143.
98. Mayelane v. Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC), at para. 51 (S. Afr.).
99. Id. at para. 50.
100. I DLO, CUSTOMARY JUSTICE, supra note 94, at para. 5.
101. Id.; IDLO, TOWARD CUSTOMARY LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 94, at para. 10.28.
102. E.S. and S.C. v. Tanzania, CEDAW/C/60/D/48/2013 (March 2015), http://www.oh
chr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/JurisprudenceSession60.aspx.
103. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 22(1), June 27, 1981, http://www.
humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights
.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
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develop customary law. Steeped in the relevant culture and close to
community needs, their resolution of diverse cases should be a creative source
of norms and solutions responsive to the times. For this to occur, however,
there needs to be a mechanism for capturing their decisions and analyzing
them to identify trends. Furthermore, a documentation component would
critically enable monitoring of decisions to ensure respect for human rights.'04
Additionally, as discussed above, the courts can help develop customary
law. As the Botswana Court of Appeal instructed, prior to declaring a customary
law unconstitutional, a court "must first consider whether no proper construction
which is consistent with the Constitution can be given to that law."'05 Justice
Ngcobo from South Africa elaborated on the importance of this role:
Where a rule of indigenous law deviates from the spirit, purport and
object of the Bill of Rights, courts have an obligation to develop it so as
to remove such deviation. This obligation is especially important in the
context of indigenous law. Once a rule of indigenous law is struck
down, that is the end of that particular rule. Yet there may be many
people who observe that rule, and who will continue to observe that
rule. And what is more, the rule may already have been adapted to the
ever-changing circumstances in which it operates. Furthermore, the
Constitution guarantees the survival of the indigenous law. These
considerations require that, where possible, courts should develop
rather than strike down a rule of indigenous law.'
Two recent groundbreaking decisions in South Africa and Botswana
show how this could work. In 2013, the South African Constitutional Court
developed customary law for the first time. In Mayelane, it developed
Xitsonga customary law to include a requirement of a first wife's consent for
the validity of a husband's marriage to subsequent wives "in accordance with
the dignity and equality demands of the Constitution."'0 7 In Ramantele, also
decided in 2013, the Botswana Court of Appeal held that Ngwaketse
104. Report of the UN Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law
and in practice, A/HRC/29/40, at para. 58 (Apr. 2, 2015) ("To ensure more effective
application of the principle of equality, State monitoring and oversight bodies must be put in
place, as has been done in Canada, Colombia and South Africa.")
105. Ramantele v. Mmusi, Case No. CACGB-104-12, Judgment [Botswana Court of
Appeal], at para. 58 (Sept. 3, 2013); see also Manu Ndulo, African Customary Law, Customs,
and Women's Rights, 18 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs 87, 92 (2011)
(pointing to the potential crucial role to be played by courts in interpreting customary law in
accordance with human rights norms).
106. Bhe v. Khayelitsha, 2004 (1) SA (CC), at para. 215 (S. Afr.) (Ngcobo, J., partially
dissenting). In the landmark Bhe case, the Court took a different route and struck down
customary intestate succession laws, which limited inheritance to the eldest male descendent,
as unconstitutional and violating equality and dignity.
107. Mayelane v. Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC), at para. 13 (S. Afr.). However, the
court failed to consider that in practice men marry more than one wife, and in many cases, a
wife does not know that she is in a polygamous marriage. While encouraging the development
of customary law through the courts, it is important to reflect on how this filters through to
women's lived reality.
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customary law allows for inheritance by girls.o8 In reaching this decision, the
Court referred to current equality values and "the increased leveling of the
power structures with more and more women heading households and
participating as equals with men," resulting in "no rational and justifiable basis
for sticking to the narrow norms of days gone by." 09 This decision is
particularly significant given the clawback clause in the Botswana
Constitution exempting customary law from non-discrimination. Nonetheless,
the court held that such exemptions could not be "unchecked" and contrary to
constitutional core values."0 Rather, as the concurring opinion explained,
"[a]ny customary law or rule which discriminates in any case against a woman
unfairly solely on the basis of her gender would not be in accordance with
humanity, morality or natural justice. Moroever, it would not be in accordance
with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.""'
While some argue that formal courts are too far removed from
communities and do not have the legitimacy to develop customary law,
courts have particular expertise in human rights and constitutional law and
through their decisions can provide the community with important guidance.
This allows the community to then have an opportunity to react and reshape
practices, engaging in dialogue with the court in the same way as a
legislature. The courts' focus, however, must be on fundamental rights.
Unlike the community or a legislature, a court is not well-placed to set out
detailed provisions developing customary law, but rather, is positioned to
judge a particular case before it. Courts have a special role to play when it
comes to basic rights rooted in human dignity that cannot be abrogated by
legislature or referendum. They are the guardians of a supra-majority that
transcends time and place, protecting constitutional values agreed upon in
advance and placed outside the control of the majority and powerful interests
at any specific moment. As the South African Constitutional Court
recognized, "development of customary law by the courts is distinct from its
development by a customary community," and the courts should focus
attention on protecting constitutional rights."2
Beyond the courtroom, the legislature has failed to significantly develop
customary law. The legislature through statutory law can set a basic
framework within which customary law functions. However, rather than
operating in parallel with customary law, statutory law fails to complement
it as it should. For this balance to occur, there needs to be "wide consultation
before the promulgation" of a new law, as well as wide dissemination. '13
Further, customary law can be a source of enrichment for statutory law, and
customary law norms can strengthen the formal legal system. As the South
African Constitutional Court explained, "customary law 'feeds into,
108. Ramantele v. Mmusi, Case No. CACGB-104-12, Judgment [Botswana Court of
Appeal], at para. 105 (Sept. 3, 2013).
109. Ramantele v. Mmusi, supra note 108, at para. 80.
110. Id. at para. 71.
111. Id. at para. 36 (Kirby, J., concurring).
112. Mayelane v. Ngwenyama, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC), at para. 45 (S. Afr.).
113. Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 L.R.C. 36, 50 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.).
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nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the amalgam"' of national law.1 14
D. APPLYING CUSTOMARY LAW
While customary justice structures provide a good alternative to courts
in many cases, customary justice is not always the answer and should never
be forced on someone."5  In other words, both parties must agree to
resolution by customary justice structures and should have the opportunity
to opt out and seek recourse from the formal court system. 16 Additionally,
there are certain cases that are not appropriate for the customary justice
system, such as those involving the criminal law" 7 or violations experienced
by children."' By officially recognizing mediation through customary
justice structures, the formal legal system can also provide guidance on how
customary justice should function, including appropriate issues to address
and the process by which to appeal decisions. 119
Moreover, just as the content of customary law requires development so
does its application. Specifically, customary justice structures themselves
must be reformed so that their membership includes women leaders in the
community. Through the KELIN project and Kenya's new Constitution,
reforms are starting in Kenya. For instance, the number of female elders in
the communities where KELIN is working has tripled, now making up one
quarter to two thirds of the total composition, depending on the community.
Likewise, in Namibia, a key element of reforming customary justice
structures so that they respond to women's needs included appointing
women at various levels of traditional leadership and as representatives in
114. Mayelane v. Ngwenyama, supra note 112, at para. 23 (quoting Alexkor Ltd v.
Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC), at para. 51).
115. Voluntariness, or the free and informed consent of both parties, is a key principle in
KELIN's work with customary justice structures. KELIN, supra note 66, at para. 12.
116. According to some, "customary dispute resolution can only work if it is backed up by
state law and if there is a possibility of state law as a last resort." INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT 9 (Janine Ubink, Thomas McInerney, eds., 2011); see also id. at para. 23.
117. By definition, states have an interest in enforcement of criminal provisions, and the accused
are entitled to the procedural protections of a formal court case. In working with customary justice
structures, KELIN ensures that they are aware of the boundaries of their authority and that they
cannot adjudicate over criminal matters, but can only assist victims in accessing the formal justice
system. KELIN further advises them to "discourage local or private family negotiations rather than
reporting to law enforcement authorities." KELIN, supra note 66, at 12.
118. Children are not in a position to represent themselves in mediation without procedural
protections, and there is the danger of their interests bargained away for gains by the family.
119. In its 2015 report, the U.N. Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women
in law and in practice highlights as a good practice formal recognition of parallel systems and
"[t]he right to appeal, before the State courts, discriminatory decisions of indigenous courts,
tribunals or arbiters." U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 60, at 57. The Kenya
Constitution specifically declares, "altemative forms of dispute resolution including ...
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms should be promoted." Const. of Kenya Aug. 27, 2010,
art. 159(2)(c). However, it only provides limited guidance, requiring that traditional dispute
resolution methods not contravene the Bill of Rights, comply with the Constitution and any
written law, and not be "repugnant to justice or morality." Id. at art. 159(3).
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village court cases.12 0  Studies subsequently found, "Having women in
visible leadership positions has a positive impact for improving both women
and men's views on the capabilities of women as community leaders and
improving justice outcomes for women."l2 '
In other parts of Africa, women are still struggling to lead cultural
institutions. For instance in Lesotho, Senate Masupha, the first born
daughter of a chief, is challenging women's inability to assume a
chieftainship based solely on their gender.'22 After a loss in Lesotho's
highest court,123 she is now taking the case on appeal to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. She explained, "This case is
not just about me but about all women in Lesotho. It is aimed at ending
women's second-class status and ensuring we have equal access to all
aspects of Lesotho life." 2 4 Indeed, the Maputo Protocol to the African
Human Rights Charter directs: "Women shall have the right to live in a
positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in the determination
of cultural policies." 2 5 Hopefully, this will soon be a reality.
IV. CONCLUSION
Customary law should neither be demonized nor romanticized. As
Vivek Maru writes, "[C]ontempt of traditional institutions and norms makes
as little sense as sanguine romanticization." 26 Rather, it is critical to engage
with both traditional and modern legal regimes, "building bridges between
them and . .. advocating for the positive evolution of each."'2 7
Customary law can further women's rights if the following conditions
are put in place:
* Customary law and justice structures incorporate human
rights norms;
* Human rights trainings are provided for both customary
justice structures, as well as the larger community,
including women and the marginalized;
* A process for defining customary law based in the human
rights principles of participation, accountability, non-
discrimination, and empowerment is established;
120. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAW ORGANIZATION (IDLO), ACCESSING JUSTICE:
MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES ON WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT 26-27 (2013),
http://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/WomensAccess toJusticeFullReport.pdf.
121. Id. at 32; see also IDLO, TOWARD CUSTOMARY LEGAL EMPOWERMENT,supra note 95,
at 10, 34.
122. Lesotho Chieftainship Act of 1968, sec. 10.
123. Masupha v. Magistrate, 2014 (Lesotho Court of Appeal).
124. News Release: Lesotho Chieftainship Case Goes to the African Commission, S. AFR.
LITIG. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.southemafricalitigationcentre.org/2014/09/09/news-
release-lesotho-chieftainship-case-goes-to-the-african-commi ssion/.
125. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa, art. 17(1).
126. Vivek Maru, Allies Unknown: Social Accountability and Legal Empowerment, 12(1)
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 85 (2010).
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* Communities, including women, youth, and marginalized
voices, play an active role in defining their customary law,
focusing on core values;
* Customary law continues to develop, primarily through the
work of customary justice structures, but also through
guidance from the courts on fundamental rights and in
interactions with the legislature;
* A mechanism exists for capturing, analyzing, and
monitoring the decisions of customary justice structures;
* Individuals have the possibility to opt out from customary
justice and seek recourse from the formal court system;
* A governing framework defines areas inappropriate for
customary law and justice;
* Customary justice structures include women leaders in the
community.
In this way, customary law has the potential to serve as an important
vehicle for justice and advancement of rights.
